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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004425

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SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT'S LIST OF STEPS FOR IRANIANS TO
RESTORE SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: President Jalal Talabani provided the Ambassador December 1 with a document that included steps for Iran to take to help restore security and support the government in Iraq. Talabani delivered the list to Iranian leaders during his November 27-29 trip to Teheran. Recommended measures included curbing support for the Jash al Mahdi and other militias; compelling Syria to end support for Ba'athists and terror groups in Iraq; exchanging security information; and supporting Iraq diplomatically and politically. Below is informal Embassy translation of the document, which has been forwarded electronically in Arabic to NEA/I-Pol. End Summary

¶2. Begin Embassy informal Translation:

¶I. The Regional Conspiracy against Iraq: The Main Reasons and Its Goals.

II.

¶1. In this conspiracy, terrorism is a tool to convince the United States it must resort to the Ba'ath and Sunni Arabs opposed to democratically-elected government in order to ensure the safety of its soldiers. This tool seeks to portray these renegade forces alone as capable of achieving security and stability in Iraq.

¶2. Terrorism is used to foil the democratically elected government and demonstrate that the Shiites and Kurds are not capable of governing and that only the reactionary Sunnis are.

¶3. Terrorism is used as a tool to kill the Shiites and displace them, thereby executing a policy of ethnic cleansing, particularly in Baghdad and Diyala.

III. The Syrians have a role in sponsoring, motivating and supporting the terrorist, Ba'athist and Saddamist forces. It is necessary to put an immediate end to such support by:

¶1. Recognizing the democratic experiment and the legitimate government in Iraq.

¶2. Condemning terrorism in all its forms; refraining from describing the renegade gangs as national opposition and justifying their existence.

¶3. Ensuring Syrian media stands beside the people of Iraq and their elected government against terrorist activities; it should support national reconciliation and not the resistance, political struggle, violence, assassinations and bombings.

¶4. Expelling the Ba'athist and the Saddamist leadership from Syria and not harboring anti-Iraq opposition forces; and preventing the passage and entry of terrorists, in a serious

and decisive manner.

¶5. Extraditing to Iraq criminals who committed heinous crimes and are wanted by the courts.

IV. The tangible contributions for Iran to make in achieving security and stability in Iraq are as follows:

¶1. In Iraq: Curbing the Mahdi Army and the armed Shiite factions associated with Iran and preventing members of these forces from carrying out assassinations, abductions, killings and acts of aggression against the state and its agencies. Convincing these forces to respect the current government and adhere to the laws and the legitimate constitution of the country.

¶2. Persuading friends of Iran to support Al-Maliki's government and its constitutional legitimacy, and to cooperate and form an allegiance with it.

¶3. Supporting Al-Maliki's government politically, diplomatically and in the media on both the regional and international levels and demonstrating this support in the Iranian official media.

¶4. Accepting U.S.-Iranian or Coalition Forces-Iranian communication in order to achieve security in Baghdad as a first step and stability in Iraq as a second step.

Note: These relations might be the first step toward reaching satisfactory American-Iranian relations.

¶5. Compelling the Syrian side to support Iraq, renounce

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terrorism, and cease harboring Saddamist Ba'athists, forces of terrorism, and armed operations.

¶6. Demanding that forces that are supported by and allies of Iran, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, refrain from providing political and media support to the terrorists under the pretext that they are resistance and demanding that they cease support for Al-Dhawi followers against the legitimate Iraqi government, and renounce the Tekfiris and condemn their crimes against the Shiites in particular, and the Iraqis in general.

Note: When Syria complies with the demands of Iraq, it will then be possible to establish political, security, commercial, oil and industrial relations, etc., and allow the Syrian-based Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and its leadership to work publicly and participate in public life and even in the government.

¶V. Support should go to the Shiite-Kurdish Coalition and its bid to win over moderate and reasonable Sunni partners such as the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is a participating partner in the governing and administration of the State.

VI. (Iran should agree to:)

¶1. Exchanging security information and forming a joint committee for said purpose.

¶2. Contributing to the support and implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan.

¶A. The trilateral Iranian-American-Iraqi agreement

¶B. The Iraqi-Iranian bilateral agreement

¶C. Agreement with the forces friendly to Iran.

VII. There should be a joint political, diplomatic and media coordination against the campaigns inimical to the new Iraq and against the fierce attack on the Shiites who are depicted as infidels, agents of Iran, and Sufis; and defense of the Kurds who are accused of betrayal and the Sunni Arabs who are accused of being renegades.

VIII. Iran should not attack the Coalition Forces in return for their pledge not to support terrorism in Iran.

IX. (Iran should) contribute, as much as possible, to the mobilization and training of the Iraqi armed forces so they may carry out their functions in maintaining security and stability.

X.

1. (Iran and Iraq should) develop a common policy for discussing the subject of withdrawal of Coalition Forces and the timetable for their pullout under the right circumstances for the Iraqi people or once security and stability are established in Iraq.

2. (Iran and Iraq should) undertake joint efforts to prepare and train Iraqi forces to replace Coalition Forces in the cities, as Coalition Forces are redeployed to specific bases in Iraq, and as authority over security is handed over to the Iraqi government.

End Embassy Translation
Khalilzad